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TRUST LAW: SETTLOR IGNORANCE OF APPLICABLE LAWS
MAY CONSTITUTE A MISTAKE OF LAW UNDER NORTH
DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 59-12-15
In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement
2013 ND 85, 831 N.W.2d 388
ABSTRACT
In In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the mistaken legal effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of
applicable laws may warrant trust reformation under North Dakota Century
Code section 59-12-15 if the moving party proves beyond clear and
convincing evidence that such effects negate the settlor’s intentions in
creating the trust. With this conclusion, the court unequivocally rejected
the application of contracting principles within the context of trust
reformation claims. As a matter of first impression in North Dakota,
Matthew Larson resolves a number of questions under North Dakota trust
reformation law, but the decision unfortunately leaves some issues
unresolved, the most important of which is Matthew Larson’s applicability
to commercial trust reformation claims. Because contracting principles will
control commercial trust reformation claims, the North Dakota Supreme
Court will have to qualify Matthew Larson so to apply solely to
noncommercial trust reformations. In doing so, North Dakota will have to
adopt a bifurcated trust reformation scheme that recognizes two distinct
categories of trust reformation claims that are premised upon the exchange
of consideration or the lack thereof.
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FACTS

Throughout the years, William and Patricia Clairmont, Matthew
Larson’s grandparents, created various irrevocable trusts for the benefit of
their grandchildren.1 In 1996, the Clairmonts created the Matthew Larson
Trust Agreement, which directed the trust’s trustee to equally distribute the
trust’s remainder to Matthew’s brothers and sisters if Matthew died before

1. In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, 2013 ND 85, ¶ 3, 831 N.W.2d 388, 390.
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the trustee completely distributed the trust and Matthew left no surviving
issue.2 Additionally, in 2009, the Clairmonts created the Matthew J. Larson
Irrevocable Retirement Trust II Agreement,3 which provided that
Matthew’s brothers and sisters would equally benefit from the trust if
Matthew died intestate and without a spouse who had attained the age of
sixty or any other descendants.4
Matthew later died intestate with no decedents.5 Prior to Matthew’s
death, Matthew’s parents, Greg and Cindy Larson,6 divorced.7 Greg Larson
subsequently fathered N.J.L. and L.M.L., both of whom were Matthew’s
half-blooded siblings.8 Since Matthew died intestate, North Dakota
Century Code section 30.1-04-07 dictated that both N.J.L and L.M.L. were
entitled to inherit the trust benefits the same as Matthew’s full-blooded
siblings.9 The Clairmonts, who intended to limit the trusts’ benefits to their
lineal descendants,10 were unaware of North Dakota Century Code section
30.1-04-07 or its implications at the time they executed either trust.11
Accordingly, the Clairmonts petitioned the district court to reform both
trusts under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.12 The district
court applied contracting principles13 to conclude that a settlor’s ignorance
of applicable laws cannot constitute a mistake of law under North Dakota
Century Code section 59-12-15.14 Additionally, even if the law allowed
trust reformation based upon the effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of
applicable laws, the court found no evidence that the Clairmonts explicitly
sought to restrict the trust benefits to their lineal decedents.15 Therefore, the
court denied the Clairmonts’ reformation claim and allowed N.J.L. and
L.M.L. to benefit from both trusts. 16

2. Id.
3. Id. ¶ 5, 832 N.W.2d at 390.
4. Id. ¶ 5, 831 N.W.2d at 390-91.
5. Id. ¶ 6, 831 N.W.2d at 391.
6. Cindy Larson was one of the Clairmonts’ four children. Id. ¶ 2, 831 N.W.2d at 390.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. “Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the
whole blood.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-07 (1973).
10. Matthew Larson, ¶ 6, 831 N.W.2d at 391.
11. Id. ¶ 22, 831 N.W.2d at 396.
12. Courts may reform a trust “if it is proved . . . that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of
the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.” N.D.
CENT. CODE § 59-12-15 (2007).
13. Matthew Larson, ¶ 11, 831 N.W.2d at 392.
14. Id.
15. Id. ¶ 11, 831 N.W.2d at 393.
16. Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In recent decades, benefactors have increasingly turned to trusts for
estate planning, probate avoidance, and commercial transactions.17 This
trust proliferation unfortunately exposed the porous and mercurial nature of
the existing statutory and common laws concerning trusts, much to the legal
community’s chagrin.18 In an effort to remedy this dismay, the Uniform
Law Commission commissioned and adopted the Uniform Trust Code
(“UTC”).19 The UTC amalgamated existing principles and certain
reforms20 into a comprehensive set of codes that sought to provide
consistency and uniformity across the law.21
Like many states, changing contemporary circumstances rendered
North Dakota’s existing common and statutory laws progressively
antiquated.22 Prior to 2007, North Dakota’s trust law, which consisted of
only basic governing principles and procedures,23 remained largely
unchanged since its codification in 1877.24 Problematically, the relative
absence of any case law interpreting these laws exacerbated the dilating
disconnect between this existing statutory scheme and contemporary
realities.25 In response to this antiquation, the North Dakota Legislature
codified the UTC in 2007 as North Dakota Century Code title 59,26 and the
UTC now generally governs trust creation and administration in North
Dakota.27
A. REFORMATION PRINCIPLES UNDER NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY
CODE SECTION 59-12-15
Section 415 of the UTC, which North Dakota codified verbatim as
North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15, governs trust reformations28
17. Kirsten Franzen & Bradley Myers, Improving the Law Through Codification: Adoption
of the Uniform Trust Code in North Dakota, 86 N.D. L. REV. 321, 323 (2010).
18. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2000).
19. Franzen & Myers, supra note 17, at 323.
20. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 149 (2002).
21. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2000).
22. See N.D. LEG. COUNCIL, UNIF. TRUST CODE—BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, Comm.
on the Judiciary, 59th Sess., at 3 (N.D. 2005), available at http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/592005/docs/pdf/79025.pdf.
23. Franzen & Myers, supra note 17, at 326.
24. Id. at 325.
25. N.D. LEG. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 3.
26. Matthew Larson, ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 394.
27. The North Dakota Legislature did not adopt the UTC in whole. See Franzen & Myers,
supra note 17, at 331.
28. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (2000).
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and is applicable to both testamentary and inter vivos trusts.29 The UTC
drafters derived this section from Restatement (Third) of Property:
Donative Transfers section 12.130 (“Restatement”) and other common law
principles.31 These sections allow reformation because a mistake should
not be allowed to defeat settlor intent.32 The UTC adopted this permissive
policy for section 415 to provide judicial flexibility33 in achieving the
paramount objectives of properly effectuating settlor intent34 and preventing
unjust enrichment.35
Under UTC section 415, reformation is appropriate where a mistake of
law or fact, whether in inducement or expression, affects the trust’s specific
terms and where such a mistake negates the settlor’s intentions in creating
the trust.36 For these purposes, a mistake of fact occurs where a party’s
belief does not correspond with the material facts of a transaction.37
Contrastingly, a mistake of law occurs where a party misunderstands the
legal consequences of a particular course of action.38
Providing
illumination on the issue, the Restatement furnishes eight illustrations of
these mistakes in application.39
Most pertinent to this discussion, the Restatement expounds the
principle of mistake of law by misapplication of law in Illustration 7.40 In
this illustration, the settlor intended to create a revocable trust but
unknowingly failed to expressly reserve the power of revocation required
by law.41 The applicable law subsequently barred the settlor from revoking
the trust when the settlor so desired.42 In this situation, the Restatement

29. David English, supra note 20, at 149.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1995).
31. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000). The Uniform Law Commission intended for
the Restatement to aid in interpreting UTC § 415.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c (2001).
33. See UNIF. TRUST CODE Art. 4, Refs & Annos. (2000).
34. Id.; Estate of Taylor, 522 A.2d 641, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (effectuating settlor intent
is controlling unless contrary to law).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (2001).
36. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (2000). A mistake of expression occurs where the trust, as a
result of a scrivener’s error, misstates the settlor intentions, includes a term that the scrivener
should have excluded, or excludes a term that the scrivener should have included. Contrastingly,
a mistake of inducement occurs where the trust, as a result of settlor error, reflects the settlor’s
intent but the settlor based such intent upon a mistake of fact or law. Id. cmt.
37. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009).
38. See Matthew Larson, ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (2001).
40. Id. cmt. i., illus. 7.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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dictates that the court should reform the trust so as to include a power of
revocation if the moving party satisfies its onus of production.43
The party seeking reformation, which may include a trust’s settlors,44
trustees, or beneficiaries,45 bears the burden of proving each of UTC section
415’s elements46 by clear and convincing evidence.47 In determining
whether the movant satisfies this burden, the court must consider all direct
and circumstantial evidence pertinent to establishing settlor intent,48
regardless of whether such evidence contradicts the meaning of the trust’s
language.49 Courts may consider this potentially suspect evidence because
such evidence may be correct50 and the challenger’s heightened burden of
production sufficiently hedges against the erroneous reliance on fraudulent
or mistaken evidence.51 Provided that the movant demonstrates the virtue
of its reformation claim, the court may consider the proper method of
reformation and whether any circumstances exist that might preclude
reformation.
B. JUDICIAL REFORMATION AND DEFENSES TO REFORMATION
Certain circumstances will forestall a trust reformation claim,
regardless of whether the movant satisfies its burden of production. For
instance, reformation is inappropriate where a settlor experienced a post hoc
change of heart or where a settlor failed to properly prepare and execute the
trust documents.52 Additionally, a reformation claim is ineffective where
the unintended beneficiary, without knowledge of the circumstances
justifying reformation, changes its position in a manner that would render

43. Id.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-13 (2010).
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-15 (2010).
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c (2001).
47. Id. “[U]nder the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier
of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief
or conviction.” Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 130 (N.D. 1979).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (2001).
Permissible direct evidence may include evidence concerning the settlor’s statements, letters, or
conversations with the agent charged with drafting the trust. Permissible circumstantial evidence
may include evidence concerning the circumstances under which the settlor created the trust. Id.
cmt. d.
49. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000). In imposing the heightened standard of clear and
convincing evidence, the Restatement disposes of the plain meaning rule. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. d (2001).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. cmt. h.
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reformation inequitable.53 Moreover, laches prohibits reformation where
reformation would be inequitable because of temporal considerations.54 If
none of these defenses to reformation are available, the court may consider
how to properly reform the trust.
The UTC affords a great deal of judicial discretion and flexibility in
reforming trusts so as to effectuate settlor intent.55 In reconciling the given
circumstances with the nature of the mistake, courts may strike the language
tending to cause the mistake or add language tending to resolve the
mistake.56 In determining the most appropriate form of reformation, a court
must necessarily predicate its reformation order based upon the
particularities of a given situation.57 After determining the most appropriate
method of reformation, the judicial issuance of the reformation order
retroactively reforms the trust as of the date the settlor executed the trust.58
C. TRUST REFORMATION V. CONTRACTUAL REFORMATION
The aforementioned principles of trust reformations are peculiarly
related to those principles governing contractual reformations. Under
contracting law, reformation is inappropriate unless the parties make a
mutual mistake about the contract’s legal effects because the parties
exchanged consideration for the contract’s benefits.59 Under trust law, a
settlor’s unilateral mistake generally warrants trust reformation60 because
the beneficiary exchanged no consideration for the trust’s benefits.61
Accordingly, the exchange of consideration or the lack thereof distinguishes

53. Id. cmt. m. It should be noted that the mere erroneous distribution of trust assets does not
preclude reformation. Id. cmt. f.
54. Id. cmt. m. Passage of time may also bar a claim for reformation by virtue of an
applicable statute of limitations. Id.
55. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Judicial orders for reformation are applicable from the date of execution because
“[r]eformation does not change the agreement; it enforces the agreement.” Brinker v. Wobaco
Trust Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. App. 1980). However, the relation back to the date of
origination does not apply to certain parties. See Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397
F.2d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1968) (relation back inapplicable to nonparties); L. E. Myers Co. v. Harbor
Ins. Co., 384 N.E.2d 1340, 1346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (relation back inapplicable where it would
violate public policy).
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-14 (1943); Carlson v. Sweeney et al., 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1199
(Ind. 2008).
60. Moore v. Adkins, 576 P.2d 245, 253 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978); Brinker, 610 S.W.2d at 16364; Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ Errors: The Argument
for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990).
61. Carlson, 895 N.E.2d at 1199.
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the two bodies of law so that contracting principles are generally
inapplicable to trusts.62
This differentiation is imperative because of how these bodies of law
consider the mistaken legal effects caused by one’s ignorance of applicable
laws. Under contracting law, one’s ignorance of applicable laws cannot
warrant contractual reformation because courts will not interfere with a
contract where the contract represents the parties’ intentions but one party
misunderstood the contract’s legal effects.63 Contrastingly, under trust law,
courts have generally found that the mistaken legal effects caused by a
settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws constitutes a mistake of law because
the trust is strictly gratuitous.64 Saliently, courts will still grant a trust
reformation where a settlor was negligent in discovering a potential
mistake65 or where the mistake arises because of a settlor’s lack of care.66
Because of these differing standards, determining whether contracting or
trust laws are applicable to a given reformation claim will most likely
dictate the disposition of the claim.67
D. PRIOR APPLICATION OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION
59-12-15
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court never had occasion to
interpret North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15 prior to Matthew
Larson,68 the court previously applied North Dakota Century Code section
59-12-15 to other trust reformation claims. In Agnes M. Gassmann Trust
Wells Fargo Bank v. Reichert,69 a trust’s distributional provisions
erroneously conflicted with the settlors’ intentions.70 On appeal, the court
only considered whether the proffered evidence indicated that the district

62. Id.
63. Hovden v. Lind, 301 N.W.2d 374, 379 n.1 (N.D. 1981); 66 AM. JUR.2d Reformation of
Instruments § 17 (1973) (“Where the thought to be expressed was the idea that the parties
intended to convey, then the mistake is only one of legal consequences, and there can be no relief
by way of reformation.”).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 333 (1959). It should be noted that there is some
authority to the contrary. See Webb v. Webb, 301 S.E.2d 570, 576 (W.Va. 1983) (“it is
recognized that a party may not avoid the legal consequences on the ground of mistake . . . where
such mistake is the result of the negligence of the complaining party.”).
65. Brinker, 610 S.W.2d at 164.
66. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 59 (1937); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. l (2001).
67. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. a (2003); Moore, 576 P.2d at
253.
68. Matthew Larson, ¶ 12, 831 N.W.2d at 393.
69. 2011 ND 169, 802 N.W.2d 889.
70. Id. ¶ 4, 802 N.W.2d at 891.
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court’s reformation order was clearly erroneous.71 The court, finding in the
negative, affirmed the district court’s reformation order.72 Because
Reichert concerned issues associated with adequacy of evidence rather than
interpretations of law, Reichert provided little guidance for Matthew
Larson’s issues of first impression.
III. ANALYSIS
In Matthew Larson, the North Dakota Supreme Court, with Justice
Crothers writing for the majority, determined that the mistaken legal effects
caused by a settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws may constitute a mistake
of law under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15 if the moving
party proves beyond clear and convincing evidence that such effects negate
the settlor’s intentions in creating the trust.73 Because the Clairmonts
satisfied this burden, the court ordered reformation of both trusts so that
only the Clairmonts’ lineal descendants could benefit from the trusts, which
excluded N.J.L. and L.M.L. as beneficiaries.74 In coming to such
conclusions, the court held that principles controlling contractual
reformations and trust interpretations are inapplicable to trust
reformations.75 Justice Maring joined the majority’s findings of law,76 but
would have remanded the case for additional fact-finding.77
A. TRUST REFORMATION, CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, AND IGNORANCE
The question of the proper interpretation of North Dakota Century
Code section 59-12-15 was a matter of first impression in North Dakota.78
In his brief, Greg Larson urged the court to refer to the contracting
principles articulated in North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-1479 in
interpreting North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.80 Since
ignorance of applicable laws cannot constitute a mistake of law under North
Dakota Century Code section 9-03-14,81 Greg Larson concluded that the

71. Id. ¶ 8, 802 N.W.2d at 892.
72. Id. ¶ 23, 802 N.W.2d at 896.
73. Matthew Larson, ¶ 20, 831 N.W.2d at 396.
74. Id. ¶ 27, 831 N.W.2d at 398.
75. Id. ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
76. Id. ¶ 33, 831 N.W.2d at 399.
77. Id. ¶ 40, 831 N.W.2d at 401.
78. Id. ¶ 12, 831 N.W.2d at 393.
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-14 (1943) (providing what constitutes a mistake of law under
contracting law).
80. Matthew Larson, ¶ 14, 831 N.W.2d at 394.
81. See supra Part II.C.
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Clairmonts were not entitled to reformation.82
Contrastingly, the
Clairmonts argued that reformation was appropriate under North Dakota
Century Code section 59-12-15 because a mistake of law created a result
that was inconsistent with the their intentions in creating the trusts.83
The North Dakota Supreme Court considered these positions and began
its analysis by reciting the aforementioned principles of trust reformation
law.84 Under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15, reformation is
appropriate where the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence
what the settlors’ intentions were in creating the trust and that a mistake
affected the trust’s terms.85 Citing the UTC comments, the court noted that
it must refer to the Restatement for illustrations of reformation principles in
application.86 Additionally, the court stipulated that it was bound by the
UTC’s general purpose of providing uniformity and consistency in the law
in interpreting the rules of reformation.87 With the policy objectives of
effectuating settlor intent88 and preventing unjust enrichment89 in mind, the
court turned to the matters at hand.
Beginning with the first issue for disposition, the court declined Greg
Larson’s invitation to apply contracting principles within the context of
trust reformations.90 The court emphasized the fact that contractual
reformations require that the parties make a mutual and substantially similar
mistake about the contract’s legal effect because courts are hesitant to
create unagreed upon bargains.91 Courts do not require this mutuality for
trust reformations because the trust only concerns the settlor’s intentions in
making the donative gift.92 Because the issue of exchanged consideration
creates a fundamental distinction between the two bodies of law, 93 the court
found that principles governing contractual reformations do not control trust
reformations.94

82. Brief for Appellant, ¶ 45, In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, 2013 ND 85, 831
N.W.2d 388 (No. 2012-0319).
83. Matthew Larson, ¶ 68, 831 N.W.2d at 391.
84. Id. ¶ 10, 831 N.W.2d at 391; Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 831 N.W.2d at 393-94.
85. Id. ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 394.
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 12, 831 N.W.2d at 393.
88. Id. ¶ 10, 831 N.W.2d at 391.
89. Id. ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 394.
90. Id. ¶ 14, 831 N.W.2d at 394.
91. Id. ¶ 15, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
92. See id. ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
93. The court implied that its analysis was not all encompassing by referring readers to
existing case law from other jurisdictions. Id. ¶ 15, 831 N.W.2d at 394-95.
94. Id.
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Since North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-14 and its progeny
could not aid in interpreting North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15,
the court continued its analysis by addressing whether the mistaken legal
effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws may constitute a
mistake of law under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.
Because North Dakota Century Code title 59 lacks a definition as to what
constitutes a mistake of law,95 the court referred to and adopted the
definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary,96 which provides that a mistake
of law is “[a] mistake about the legal effect of a known fact or situation.”97
After this promulgation, the court noted that the mistake of law in
inducement referred to in North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15
arises where the trust provisions accurately reflect the settlor’s intent but the
settlor erroneously included or excluded a certain term because of a
misapplication of existing law.98 Pursuant to the comments of UTC
section 415,99 the court referred to the Restatement for illustrations of these
principles in application.100
Stating that Restatement Illustration 7 was analogous to the case at bar,
the court determined that a settlor’s awareness of an applicable law is not
required for an action to constitute a mistake of law.101 The court
specifically observed that Illustration 7 did not state that the settlor was
aware of the applicable law, only that the settlor misapprehended the law’s
legal effects.102 Accordingly, because the Clairmonts’ misapprehended the
legal effects of using the term “brothers and sisters,” the district court erred
in finding that, as a matter of law, the Clairmonts’ failed to satisfy the
requirements of North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.103 However,
the court noted that the legal effects caused by the Clairmonts’ ignorance
would warrant reformation of the trusts only if the Clairmonts provided
clear and convincing evidence of such effects.104

95. Id. ¶ 17, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
96. Id.
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009).
98. Matthew Larson, ¶¶ 17-18, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
99. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000).
100. Matthew Larson, ¶¶ 18-19, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
103. Id. ¶ 20, 831 N.W.2d at 396.
104. Id.
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B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WARRANTING REFORMATION
Citing the district court’s findings of facts, the court found that the
Clairmonts satisfied this onus of production.105 The Clairmonts each
testified that they intended for only their lineal grandchildren to benefit
from the trusts in the event that one of their grandchildren passed before the
trusts’ natural expirations.106 Additionally, the attorney who drafted the
first trust testified that he never discussed the potential implications of
North Dakota Century Code section 30.1-04-07 with the Clairmonts107 and
that he never understood it to be the Clairmonts’ intentions to include N.J.L.
and L.M.L. as beneficiaries.108 Furthermore, one of the trustees testified
that the Clairmonts created the trusts to protect their grandchildren’s longterm financial viability.109 Based upon such information, the court
concluded that the Clairmonts never intended to include N.J.L. or L.M.L. as
beneficiaries and that the trusts should be reformed accordingly.110
C. INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES INAPPLICABLE TO REFORMATIONS
With this conclusion, the court disregarded Greg Larson’s argument
that the proffered evidence failed to evince clear and convincing
evidence.111 Greg Larson contended that the court should discern the
Clairmonts’ intentions from the face of the trust documents.112 Specifically,
Greg Larson argued that the Clairmonts actually intended to allow persons
not of Clairmont lineage to benefit from the trusts because each trust
allowed as much under limited circumstances.113 Accordingly, Greg Larson
concluded that N.J.L and L.M.L. should remain beneficiaries of both trusts
because such inclusion would be consistent with the trusts’ language.114
The court, conceding that courts will discern settlor intent from the
trust document if the document is unambiguous,115 rejected Greg Larson’s
argument because such principles are applicable only to trust

105. Id. ¶ 27, 831 N.W.2d at 398.
106. Id. ¶ 22, 831 N.W.2d at 396.
107. Id. ¶ 23, 831 N.W.2d at 396-97.
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 24, 831 N.W.2d at 397.
110. Id. ¶ 27, 831 N.W.2d at 397.
111. Id. ¶ 25, 831 N.W.2d at 397.
112. Id.
113. Id. For instance, Matthew could designate a potential beneficiary or convey his trust
assets to creditors. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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interpretations.116
The court observed that trust interpretation and
reformation claims are inherently dissimilar because interpretation claims
solely concern language already contained within the trust document
whereas reformation claims may involve the addition or subtraction of
language from the original document.117 Thus, the court rejected Greg
Larson’s argument and found that principles of trust interpretations are
inapplicable to trust reformations.118
D. MAJORITY’S CONCLUSION
In concluding its analysis, the court again noted that the district court
misconstrued the law in rejecting the Clairmonts’ reformation claim
because the legal effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws
may warrant trust reformation under North Dakota Century Code section
59-12-15.119 Given the totality of the record, the court opined “that the only
conclusion to be reached is that a mistake of law was made affecting the
terms of the trusts and the Clairmonts’ intent.”120 In order to rectify this
mistake in light of the foregoing principles, the court remanded the case to
the district court with the instruction to reform both trusts so that only those
individuals of Clairmont lineage could benefit from the trusts.121
E. MARING CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Justice Maring concurred in the majority’s conclusions of law.122
However, Justice Maring found that there was insufficient evidence to make
a warranted conclusion as to whether the Clairmonts met their standard of
production123 because the available evidence was susceptible to conflicting
interpretations.124 As such, Justice Maring would have remanded the case
for further fact-finding.125
IV. IMPACT
As a matter of first impression, Matthew Larson presents a number of
questions moving forward as trusts become increasingly popular amongst a
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 28, 831 N.W.2d at 397.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 27.
Id. ¶ 31, 831 N.W.2d at 398 (Maring, J., concurring).
Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 831 N.W.2d at 399.
Id. ¶ 39, 831 N.W.2d at 401.
Id. ¶ 40, 831 N.W.2d at 401.
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burgeoning class of aging benefactors. First, because Matthew Larson
appears to create conflicting interpretations concerning the consequences of
one’s ignorance within North Dakota trust law, the court may have to
elaborate on the consequences of one’s ignorance in other trust contexts and
the extent to which the court may be willing to redefine other established
legalese in the limited context of trust reformation claims. Second, the
North Dakota Supreme Court may have to elaborate on the extent to which,
if any, it is willing to rely upon contracting principles to help develop North
Dakota trust reformation law. Finally, because contracting principles will
control commercial trust reformation claims, the North Dakota Supreme
Court will have to qualify Matthew Larson so to apply solely to
noncommercial trust reformations, which will necessarily create two classes
of trust reformation claims in North Dakota.
A. MISTAKE OF LAW DEFINED
As a matter of first impression, Matthew Larson will surely influence
the development of North Dakota trust law. Specifically, the decision
defines what constitutes a mistake of law under North Dakota Century Code
title 59126 and takes an expansive interpretation of this definition to include
the mistaken legal effects of unknown applicable laws.127 However, the
extent of this influence remains unclear because Matthew Larson’s
interpretation conflicts with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s previous
holdings in other facets of trust law.
In the trust interpretation case of Langer v. Pender,128 the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen you intend the facts to which the law
attaches a consequence, you must abide the consequence whether you
intend it or not.”129 With this statement, the court seemed to memorialize
the adages that a “reasonable person is deemed to know the law” and
“ignorance of the law is no excuse”130 within the context of North Dakota
trust law. Under these canons, ignorance is no mistake131 because a party
may be indemnified of liability after committing a mistake but must account
for its ignorance.132 By distinguishing Langer133 and articulating a new

126. Id. ¶ 17, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
127. Id. ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
128. 2009 ND 51, 764 N.W.2d 159.
129. Id. ¶ 29, 764 N.W.2d at 168 (quoting In re Estate of Duemeland, 528 N.W.2d 369, 371
(N.D. 1995)).
130. Retired Pub. Emp. Council of Wa. v. State Dept. of Ret. Sys., 16 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001).
131. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Groover, 14 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941).
132. Brock v. O’Dell, 21 S.E.2d 976, 978 (S.C. 1895).
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definition of a mistake of law that absolves the consequences of settlor
ignorance, Matthew Larson thusly creates conflicting interpretations
concerning the consequences of one’s ignorance within North Dakota
Century Code title 59.
This conflict raises numerous questions. For instance will Langer or
Matthew Larson’s position on ignorance and its associated consequences
control when the North Dakota Supreme Court considers issues of first
impression in other facets of trust law? Additionally, since the court
interpreted the term mistake of law contrary to longstanding edicts, would
the court be willing to reinterpret other established legalese for the limited
purpose of trust reformation claims? The recent proliferation of trust usage
will assuredly lead to an increase in litigation and the need for future
elaboration on these and other questions.
B. INFLUENCE OF CONTRACTING PRINCIPLES
Matthew Larson’s influence on North Dakota trust law will also stem
from the fact the decision seems to create a precarious relationship between
contracting and trust reformation law in North Dakota. It is curious that the
North Dakota Supreme Court belabored the point that contracting principles
do not govern trust reformations yet cited a contractual reformation case134
and adopted a governing definition for the term “mistake of law” that
Black’s Law Dictionary derived from established contracting law.135 This
reliance on contracting principles raises an important question:
notwithstanding the fact that contracting principles do not govern trust
reformations, can contracting principles at least influence North Dakota
trust reformation law after Matthew Larson?
The aforementioned circumstances imply in the affirmative and such
an inference is consistent with larger trends in the law. Throughout the
years, contracting and trust law have steadily converged to the extent that
there no longer remains any material distinction between contracting and
trust law in numerous respects.136 Some commentators conclude that this
convergence emanates from the fact that trusts are fundamentally a
“contractarian institution”137 and that trust law is actually a subset of

133. Matthew Larson, ¶ 26, 831 N.W.2d at 397.
134. Id. ¶ 10, 831 N.W.2d at 391 (citing Spitzer v. Bartleson, 2009 N.D. 179, 773 N.W.2d
798)).
135. Black’s Law Dictionary specifically refers to the cases contained in Contracts Keynote
93(4) as the basis of its definition. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009).
136. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis for the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
652-55 (1995).
137. Id. at 628.
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contract law.138 The convergence of trust and contracting law in these
respects has manifested itself in the observation that courts have
increasingly referred to trusts as contracts.139 Thus, one can construe the
North Dakota Supreme Court’s limited deference to contracting principles
in developing Matthew Larson as consistent with larger trends in trust law.
Despite this observation, however, Matthew Larson still makes it
unclear as to where exactly North Dakota trust reformation law figures into
the relational dichotomy of trust and contracting law. Contracting law will
certainly not govern certain trust reformation claims after Matthew
Larson.140 However, the court’s citations at least imply that contracting
principles may guide the development of trust reformation law.
Accordingly, in the future, the North Dakota Supreme Court may have to
elaborate on the extent to which, if any, it is willing to rely upon contracting
principles in developing North Dakota trust reformation law.
C. FUTURE NEED TO DISTINGUISH MATTHEW LARSON
In determining Matthew Larson’s future applicability, it is imperative
to note that parties have increasingly turned to trusts to conduct business
transactions as assets held in commercial trusts141 far exceed those held in
noncommercial trusts.142 This increased pervasiveness makes it nearly
inevitable that North Dakota courts will encounter claims seeking
reformation of commercial trusts. However, Matthew Larson will be of
little import in these situations because the North Dakota Supreme Court
predicated Matthew Larson upon the reasoning that contracting principles
do not govern trust reformations for want of consideration.143
In recognizing Matthew Larson’s limited future applicability, one must
recognize that, with commercial trusts, the parties exchange consideration
for transferring trust benefits.144 This recognition is of the utmost
importance because, “where the owner of property receives consideration
for making a transfer of the property in trust, the rules applicable to

138. Id. at 627.
139. David Horton, Unconsionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675,
1677 n.8 (2009).
140. Matthew Larson, ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
141. Here, the term “commercial trust” refers to “a trust that implements bargained-for
exchange.” John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1997).
142. English, supra note 20, at 149. Here, noncommercial trusts refers to those trusts that do
not qualify as commercial trusts.
143. Matthew Larson, ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 394-95.
144. See Langbein, supra note 137, at 167.
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transfers for value and to contracts are applicable.”145 Applying these
contracting principles to commercial trusts, courts may reform a
commercial trust only where the parties make a mutual mistake of law or
fact.146 Under this principle, the legal effects caused by a settlor’s
ignorance of applicable laws would not warrant reformation because
reformation is only appropriate under such circumstances where the parties
make a mutual mistake of law or fact.147 Thus, Matthew Larson would
have resulted in a different outcome had Matthew exchanged consideration
for the enjoyment of the trust benefits.
Due to this contradictory conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court
will have to stipulate that the conclusion that “[b]ecause the creation of a
trust is different than the execution of a contract, legal principles related to
reformation of a contract do not control in trust cases”148 strictly applies to
the reformation claims of noncommercial trusts.
Pursuant to this
stipulation, North Dakota will have to recognize two distinct categories of
trust reformation claims that are premised upon the exchange of
consideration or the lack thereof.149 The creation of this bifurcated
categorization is of paramount importance because, as seen above, the
characterization of a particular trust as commercial or noncommercial and
the associated applicability or inapplicability of contracting principles may
dictate the disposition of a reformation claim. Therefore, Matthew Larson
will almost assuredly not be the court’s final interpretation of North Dakota
Century Code section 59-12-15.
V. CONCLUSION
In In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the mistaken legal effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of
applicable laws may warrant trust reformation under North Dakota Century
Code section 59-12-15 if the moving party proves beyond clear and
convincing evidence that such effects negate the settlor’s intentions in
creating the trust. In coming to this conclusion, the court articulated a new
and expansive definition of the term mistake of law for the purposes of
North Dakota Century Code title 59. With these conclusions, the court also
held that principles governing contractual reformations are inapplicable to

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 333 cmt. e (1959).
See supra Part II.C.
Id.
Matthew Larson, ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395.
Some authority appears to recognize such a distinction. See Moore, 576 P.2d at 253;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 62 cmt. a (2003).
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trust reformations. Despite these clarifications, Matthew Larson leaves
numerous questions unanswered and other issues potentially muddled, the
most important of which is the broadly worded conclusion that contracting
principles cannot control trust reformation claims. For the foregoing
reasons, such an unqualified pronouncement may have been misguided.
Consequently, because contracting principles will control commercial trust
reformation claims, the North Dakota Supreme Court will have to qualify
Matthew Larson so to apply solely to noncommercial trust reformations. In
doing as much, North Dakota will have to recognize a bifurcated trust
reformation scheme that involves two classes of trust reformation claims
that are premised upon the exchange of consideration or lack thereof.
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